

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

[REDACTED]
19 June 1981Copy No. 10

25X1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - June 1981

25X1

1. The meeting focused on the implications of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Tuwaitha and the possibilities of Iraq/Arab retaliation. Representatives did not think it likely that an Iraqi reaction would take the form of an attack against either Israel or the US.

- Baghdad recognizes the improbability of military success
- Saddam Hussein sees himself "on the side of the angels" while Israel increasingly is viewed as the international pariah. He is anxious to perpetuate that perception.
- Iraq increasingly is stressing the diplomatic option and is not likely to soon slide back into historical pattern of terrorist thuggery.
- Iraq may, however, try to use radical Palestinians to engage in acts of terrorism if they are willing to do Baghdad's bidding. [REDACTED]

25X1

2. Attendees also saw as unlikely an Iraqi attempt to deal a knockout punch against Iran in an attempt to recoup lost prestige. Iraq has no stomach for a military offensive and Saddam appears more than ever anxious to get the war over with. Saddam also is likely to pursue efforts to patch things up with Syria; similar pro forma efforts may be made with Libya but Iraq expects no meaningful results with Tripoli. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1
25X1TOP SECRET [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

3. Of considerable concern to participants was the impact of the raid on US relations with the Arab world. The environment has soured: we have placed our moderate Arab friends in a difficult position and although US cooperation with Iraq on the UN resolution will help smooth over recent abrasions, we should not rule out the possibility of concrete actions against US interests in the future. [REDACTED]

25X1

4. The internal Iranian scene remains confused with analysts unable to provide more than clues as to the impact of the Bani Sadr affair on the Iranian political equation. The possibility exists that his ouster will more clearly polarize opposing forces, making likely a "reign of terror" that could erupt as early as this summer. The possibility of the rise of some as yet unidentified military strong man to challenge the Khomeini clique has caused the IRP to firmly warn the military to stay out of politics. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

6. Israeli action to take out the missiles in Lebanon was seen as unlikely in the period prior to the 30 June Israeli election. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

25X1

19 June 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - June 1981

NIC/A/NIO/NESA [redacted] 19 June 81 [redacted]

25X1

Distribution:

Copy 1 - DCI

2 - DDCI

3 - ER

4 - D/NFAC

5 - DD/NFAC

6 - C/NIC

7 - SA/CI [redacted]

8 - NIO/NESA

9 - NIO/NESA

10 - NIO/W

11 - NIO/PE

12 - NIO/USSR

13 - NIO/EA

14 - NIO/GPF

15 - NIO/LA

16 - NIO/WE

17 - NIO/AF

18 - NIO/SP

19 - SA/NPI

20 - D/OCO

21 - D/OCR

22 - D/OER

23 - D/OPA

24 - D/OSR

25 - D/OGSR

26 - D/OSWR

27 - D/OIA

28 - SRP

29 - NSC Coordinator

30 - OPA/NESA

31 - OPA/USSR [redacted]

32 - OER/D/NE [redacted]

33 - OER/D/SA [redacted]

34 - OSWR/LS [redacted]

35 - NFAC/CRES [redacted]

36 - NFAC Registry

37 - OCO/FLS [redacted]

38 - DDO/NE [redacted]

39 - DDO/EPDS [redacted]

40 - DDO/C/ [redacted]

41 - NCPO/NE [redacted]

42 - NPIC/IEG/ [redacted]

43 - NPIC/IEG/ [redacted]

44 - OD&E/FO [redacted]

45 - State/INR/RNA (George Harris)

46 - DIO/NE

47 - NSA/G-6 [redacted]

48 - ACSI DAMI FII (LTC James Ritchey)

49 - ONI/Estimates Br. (Alexander Button)

50 - AF/INER (Maj. Ronald Bergquist)

51 - HQ USMC Code INTP (Maj. Pete Kosmo)

52 - NSC (Geoffrey Kemp)

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1